In the 1960s and early 1970s, the main division was between the neo-Keynesians and the monetarist school. This was not merely a dispute about whether the "IS curve" or "LM curve" was more interest-elastic, or whether monetary policy or fiscal policy was more potent for purposes of aggregate-demand management, as it was sometimes portrayed in undergraduate textbooks. Instead, the two schools had quite different conceptions of economics, and as a consequence frequently argued past one another. The Keynesians sought to estimate structural econometric models that could be used to predict the short-run effects of alternative government policies; in this enterprise, they did not require the relations that constituted their models to be interpretable other than relatively loosely in terms of any economic theory, but argued for the empirical relevance of the models on the basis of their fit with aggregate time series. The monetarists were instead skeptical of this entire project: they denied that one could expect to reliably model short-run adjustment processes, and instead emphasized the more robust predictions of economic theory about long-run outcomes; they doubted the usefulness of structural econometric models, and preferred to base their positive and normative analyses on plots showing the co-movements of aggregate time series, and on narrative accounts of economic developments; and they scoffed at the aspiration to "fine tune" the business cycle using quantitative models.
In the late 1970s and the 1980s, the terms of debate shifted with the rise to prominence of the "New Classical" school and real business cycle theory. In some ways, the New Classicals might have seemed merely new recruits to the monetarist cause, defending many of the same theses albeit with more modern weapons.
1 Yet their methodological position was quite different. Both the New Classical authors and the real business cycle theorists took the central task of macroeconomics to be the construction of structural models of short-run fluctuations, though they differed sharply from Keynesian modelers in their conception of the requirements for a coherent macroeconomic model, insisting on a rigorously formulated intertemporal general-equilibrium structure. The central division among macroeconomists ceased to be about whether one should try to precisely model short-run dynamics, and came instead to be about whether it was more important to insist upon theoretical coherence in one's models, even if this meant doing without econometric validation (the position of the New Classical economists and real business cycle theorists), or to insist upon econometric testing, even if this meant using specifications little constrained by theory (the position of the Keynesian macroeconometric modelers).
In the context of this history, I believe that there has been a considerable convergence of opinion among macroeconomists over the past ten or fifteen years. While the problems of the field have hardly all been resolved, there are no longer such fundamental disagreements among leading macroeconomists about what kind of questions one might reasonably seek to answer or what kinds of theoretical analyses or empirical studies should even be admitted as contributions to knowledge. To some extent, this is because positions that were vigorously defended in the past have had to be conceded in the face of further argument and experience. But to an important extent, it is also because progress in macroeconomic analysis has made it possible to see that the alternatives between which earlier generations felt it necessary to choose were not so thoroughly incompatible when understood more deeply. The cessation of methodological struggle within macroeconomics is largely due to the development of a new synthesis ---called by Marvin Goodfriend and Robert G. King (1997) "the New Neoclassical
Synthesis" ---that incorporates important elements of each of the apparently irreconcilable traditions of macroeconomic thought.
II. Elements of the New Synthesis
What, exactly, do macroeconomists ---at least those macroeconomists concerned with understanding the determinants of national income, inflation, and the effects of monetary and fiscal policy ---now generally agree about? Here I briefly list some of the most important examples of formerly contentious issues about which there is now fairly wide agreement. Instead, what is important is having general-equilibrium models in the broad sense of requiring that all equations of the model be derived from mutually consistent foundations, and that the specified behavior of each economic unit make sense given the environment created by the behavior of the others. At one time, Walrasian competitive equilibrium models were the only kind of models with these features that were well understood; but this is no longer the case. Nonetheless, modern empirical macroeconomics differs from classic postwar macroeconometric modeling in deeper respects than the mere introduction of new approaches to estimation. In particular, a great deal more attention is given to the grounds for treating an econometric model as "structural" for purposes of a policy evaluation exercise. In the past, the specification of structural relations was often based only loosely on economic theory; the specific form of the relations was supposed to be dictated by the criterion of goodness of "fit," but in practice simple computational convenience played a large role in determining which kinds of relations one would attempt to "fit" to the data.
(For example, one would assume purely backward-looking causal relations among a set of variables that happened to be part of one's data set, because of the convenience of estimating the coefficients of relations assumed to be of that form.) Now, instead, specifications that are intended to represent structural relations are derived from explicit decision problems of households or firms; adjustment delays are allowed for, but these are assumed to be constraints that are taken account of by optimizing agents, rather than arbitrary modifications of the optimal decision rule.
Relatively atheoretical methods ---such as the estimation of unrestricted autoregressive or vector-autoregressive models ---continue to be important in empirical macroeconomics, and indeed have become more important since the 1980s than they had been earlier. But a clearer distinction is now made between work that aims only at the characterization of data, under a priori assumptions that are as weak as possible, and work that tries to represent structural relations. Pure data characterization is useful as a way of establishing facts that structural models should be expected to explain, but it is not a substitute for structural modeling. Instead, the two types of empirical work are complementary, two distinct parts of a single empirical research program that seeks to develop empirically validated quantitative models that can sensibly be used in counterfactual policy analysis.
Modern macroeconomic modelers also depart from the early postwar literature in taking a more eclectic approach to the estimation of model parameters and testing of model predictions. One reason is that the modern style of structural model, with its deeper behavioral foundations, is not merely a prediction about the statistical properties of one particular type of data; instead, it simultaneously makes claims about many things ---both individual behavior and the behavior of aggregates, both short-run dynamics and long-run averages ---so that many different kinds of data are relevant in principle, both to model parameterization and to judging the model's empirical relevance. As a result, many different approaches to empirical analysis provide complementary perspectives on the quantitative realism of a given model.
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It sometimes appears to outsiders that macroeconomists are deeply divided over issues of empirical methodology. There continue to be, and probably will always be, heated disagreements about the degree to which individual empirical claims are convincing. A variety of empirical methods are used, both for data characterization and for estimation of structural relations, and researchers differ in their taste for specific methods, often depending on their willingness to employ methods that involve more specific a priori assumptions. But the existence of such debates should not conceal the broad agreement on more basic issues of method. Both "calibrationists" and the practitioners of Bayesian estimation of DSGE models agree on the importance of doing "quantitative theory," both accept the importance of the distinction between pure data characterization and the validation of structural models, and both have a similar understanding of the form of model that can properly be regarded as structural.
3. It is now widely agreed that it is important to model expectations as endogenous, and in particular, that in policy analysis it is crucial to take into account the way in which expectations ought to be different in the case that an alternative policy were to be adopted. This was, of course, the point of the celebrated Lucas (1976) Acceptance of the methodological precepts of the "rational expectations revolution" has not, however, meant acceptance of the view that stabilization policy is necessarily ineffective, as early commentary on the implications of that development often assumed. In modern DSGE models with sticky wages and/or prices, the fact that wage-and price-setting decisions are made on the basis of rational expectations has important consequences for the nature of the tradeoff between inflation and real activity, and for the way in which it makes sense to think about the effects of policy. One cannot expect there to be a simple answer about the effects of a given policy action, independently of whether the action is anticipated in advance or not; of whether the change in policy is expected to be persistent or not; and of what the policy authority announces about its policy intentions. Yet these models typically imply that alternative systematic policies should lead to very different patterns of evolution of real activity, and that it should be quite possible, given sufficiently accurate real-time data, to design feedback rules for policy that achieve a greater degree of stabilization than less "activist" policies would achieve. As shown by John B. Taylor (1979) and a large subsequent literature, optimal control techniques (suitably adapted to deal with forward-looking structural relations) can be used to design ideal stabilization policies given such a model.
4.
It is now widely accepted that real disturbances are an important source of economic fluctuations; the hypothesis that business fluctuations can largely be attributed to exogenous random variations in monetary policy has few if any remaining adherents.
While studies such as those of Julio J. Rotemberg and Michael Woodford (1997) or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) estimate the effects of exogenous disturbances to monetary policy and assess the ability of structural models to account for these effects, this is because of the usefulness of this particular empirical test as a way of discriminating among alternative models, and not because of any assertion that such disturbances are a primary source of aggregate variability. In fact, Altig et al. (2005) conclude that monetary policy shocks (identified by their VAR) account for only 14 percent of the variance of fluctuations in aggregate output at business-cycle frequencies; Smets and Wouters (2007) find that monetary policy shocks account for less than 10 percent of the forecast error variance decomposition for aggregate output at any horizon.
By "real disturbances" I do not mean solely the "technology shocks" emphasized by the real business cycle theory of the 1980s. Modern empirical DSGE models, like that of Smets and Wouters, include a variety of types of disturbances to technology, preferences, and government policies (including fiscal shocks), and part of the variability in aggregate time series is attributed to each of these types of shocks. However, technology shocks of one type or another are typically among the more important disturbances.
than is the pure monetarist view. While empirical DSGE models like that of Smets and Wouters do allow one to speak meaningfully of short-run departures from the "equilibrium" or "natural" level of real activity, that "natural rate of output" is not at all a smooth trend, and the disturbances that result in temporary departures from the natural rate typically also shift the natural rate.
At the same time, the claim that purely monetary disturbances are not the main documented the degree to which the evolution of measures of real marginal cost can explain variations in the inflation rate. 4 But it is now understood that neither the theoretical plausibility nor the empirical success of such models implies in any way that inflation is determined by factors over which monetary policy has little influence. Not only is a Phillips curve in itself incomplete as a model of inflation (as it is merely a relation among endogenous variables), but the structure of general-equilibrium models implies that household and firm behavior alone can at most determine the structure of relative prices, rather than the absolute level of (monetary) prices, so that it must be government policy that supplies the "nominal anchor" if one is to exist. 
III. Remaining Disagreement
While the study of business fluctuations is no longer riven by the kind of disagreements about the foundations of macroeconomic analysis that characterized the decades following World War II, one cannot deny that important differences in methodological orientation remain among macroeconomists. Probably the most obvious divisions within the field today concern the importance attached by different researchers to work aspiring to the status of "pure science" relative to work intended to address applied problems. This leads to differing evaluations of the degree of progress recently achieved in the field, which might suggest to outside observers that the foundations of the subject remain fundamentally contested, even though, as I have argued above, there are really no longer alternative approaches to the resolution of macroeconomic issues.
One hears expressions of skepticism about the degree of progress in macroeconomics from both sides of this debate ---from those who complain that macroeconomics is too little concerned with scientific rigor, and from those who complain that the field has been too exclusively concerned with it. On the one hand, some protest that the current generation of empirical DSGE models, mentioned above as illustrations of the new synthesis in methodology, have not been validated with sufficiently rigorous methods to be used in policy analysis (e.g., Chari, Kehoe, and Ellen R. McGrattan, 2008) . Proponents of this view do not typically assert that some other available model would be more reliable for that purpose instead; instead, they argue that scholars with intellectual integrity have no business commenting on policy issues at all.
Lest there be confusion on this point, I should clarify that in asserting the existence of convergence in methodology, I do not mean to claim that all important theoretical and empirical issues in macroeconomics have been resolved. There is as yet little certainty about how best to specify an empirically adequate model of aggregate fluctuations; while efforts such as those of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) or Wouters (2003, 2007) are encouraging, it would be foolish to claim that these models represent settled truth. Work in this vein is sufficiently new that one can hardly be surprised if, a decade from now, the best available models for use in policy analysis differ from these in important (though as yet unforeseeable) respects.
This does not mean that the use of such models as a basis for counter-factual policy simulations involves doubtful claims about the empirical validity of the models.
Policy decisions must constantly be made, despite policymakers' uncertainty about the precise effects of alternative choices; even if one restricts the aims of policy ---say, to a concern purely with inflation stabilization ---difficult decisions must be made as to how to employ the available instruments of policy in the service of that goal. One cannot but base policy advice on provisional models, unless one is willing to allow policy to be made on even more ill-informed grounds. Of course, honest advice will be open about the places where there are obvious grounds for uncertainty about the provisional conclusions obtained from currently available models; and prudent policy decisions will seek to be robust to possible errors resulting from reliance on a faulty model. Questions about the robustness of the conclusions from policy analyses can be and are addressed within the current mainstream paradigm for macroeconomic analysis; Andrew Levin et al. (2005) provides a good example.
Nor is it convincing to suggest that improved policy advice might more reliably be obtained by devoting current research efforts solely to the clarification of "first principles" of macroeconomic theory, in the expectation that progress in understanding of fundamental theory should eventually eliminate uncertainty about policy issues as well.
While research aimed purely at theoretical clarification can surely be valuable, there is little reason to expect that the theoretical issues that come to be better understood will be the ones that matter for the improvement of policy unless researchers directly address themselves to questions of public policy, or at least to questions raised by those who do.
In a recent essay, Mankiw (2006) Finally, adjustment dynamics were modeled not by simply adding arbitrary lags to structural relations, or even by ad hoc "partial adjustment" dynamics, but on the basis of dynamic optimization problems for the various decisionmakers that incorporated explicit (though flexibly parameterized) adjustment costs.
Around the same time, new macroeconomic models were introduced at other central banks, such as the Bank of Canada's Quarterly Projection Model (Donald Coletti et al., 1996) and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's Forecasting and Projection System (Richard Black et al., 1997) , that were similarly modern in their emphasis on endogenous expectations and long-run dynamics consistent with an equilibrium model. And these were not mere research projects, but models routinely used for practical policy deliberations, under the "forecast targeting" approach to monetary policy employed by both of those central banks starting in the 1990s.
In the decade since then, as the scholarly literature has devoted more attention to the development of models that are both theoretically consistent and empirically tested, RAMSES and the New Area-Wide Model are estimated models; the teams responsible for GEM and NEMO have both indicated an intention to estimate their models using Bayesian methods as well, though only calibrated versions of the models are in use at present. 7 There are also a great many other methodologically ambitious modeling projects underway within the research staffs of policy institutions, including the Federal Reserve System; here I have mentioned only models that are already being used, or have clearly been developed to be used, in policy analysis by the institution responsible for developing the model. 8 On the extent to which aspects of the conventional wisdom circa 1970 have been repudiated by practicing central bankers, and the role of the academic literature in this development, see Goodfriend (2007) . In Goodfriend's characterization, "the story is one of mutually reinforcing advances in theory and practice" (p. 57).
new policy of discussing the quantitative forecasts of the FOMC members as part of the Committee's published minutes, Governor Frederic S. Mishkin explained the policy change to the public in a speech titled "The Federal Reserve's Enhanced Communication
Strategy and the Science of Monetary Policy" (Mishkin, 2007) . This suggests, to me at least, that the "disconnect" between the science of macroeconomics and the engineering side is not as great as Mankiw claims. 9 There remains, of course, a great deal for macroeconomists to be humble about, as Mankiw urges; the reduced level of dissension within the field does not mean that we now have an adequate understanding of the problems addressed by it. One can still hope for much more progress, and competition among contending approaches and hypotheses will almost inevitably be part of the process through which such progress can occur. But the current moment is one in which prospects are unusually bright for the sort of progress that has lasting consequences, due to the increased possibility of productive dialogue between theory and empirical work, on the one hand, and between theory and practice on the other.
